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Freedom of Expression and Religious Sensitivities in 
Pluralist Societies: Facing the Challenge of Extreme 
Speech 
Jeroen Temperman

  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, with respect to religion, the meaning and scope of the 
freedom of expression has been tested. Specifically, concerns about 
religious sensitivities within religiously pluralist societies have made a 
profound impact on the workings of the political bodies of the United 
Nations, with respect to which special mention must be made of the 
“Combating Defamation of Religions” resolutions adopted in recent 
years by the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.1  
 
In response to these resolutions, legal scholars have expressed 
sincere concern that the emerging counter-defamation discourse appears 
to overstep the mark and may very well foster illegitimate interferences 
 
    Assistant Professor of Public International Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam; 
Editor-in-Chief, Religion & Human Rights. 
 1. And, previously, by the former Commission on Human Rights. See Comm’n on Human 
Rights Res. 1999/82, Report on the 55th Sess., Mar. 22–Apr. 30, 1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167, 
at 280 (Apr. 30, 1999); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/84, Report on the 56th Sess., Mar. 20–
Apr. 28, 2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/167, at 336 (Apr. 26, 2000); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 
2001/4, Report on the 57th Sess., Mar. 19–Apr. 27, 2001, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/167, at 47 (Apr. 
18, 2001); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2002/9, Report on the 58th Sess., Mar. 18–Apr. 26, 2002, 
ESCOR, Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/200, at 59 (Apr. 15, 2002); Comm’n on Human 
Rights Res. 2003/4, Report on the 59th Sess., Mar. 17–Apr. 24, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/135, 
at 34 (Apr. 14, 2003); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2004/6, Report on the 60th Sess., Mar. 15–
Apr. 23, 2004, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127, at 28 (Apr. 13, 2004); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 
2005/3, Report on the 61st Sess., Mar. 14–Apr. 22, 2005, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/135, at 21 (Apr. 
12, 2005); see also Human Rights Council Res. 4/9, Rep. to the Gen. Assembly on the 4th Sess. of 
the Human Rights Council, Mar. 12–30, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/123, at 19 (Mar. 30, 2007); 
Human Rights Council Res. 7/19, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 7th Sess., Mar. 3–Apr. 1, 
2008, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/78, at 54 (Mar. 27, 2008); Human Rights Council Res. 10/22, Rep. of the 
Human Rights Council, 10th Sess., Mar. 2–Mar. 27, 2009, U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 53, 
A/64/53, at 74 (Mar. 26, 2009); Human Rights Council Res. 13/16, Res. Adopted by the Human 
Rights Council, 13th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/13/16, at 1 (Mar. 25, 2010); G.A. Res. 60/150, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/150 (Dec. 16, 2005); G.A. Res. 61/164, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/164 (Dec. 19, 
2006); G.A. Res. 62/154, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/154 (Dec. 18, 2007); G.A. Res. 63/171, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/63/171 (Dec. 18, 2008); G.A. Res. 64/156, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156 (Dec. 18, 2009). 
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with the fundamental right to freedom of expression and the religious 
rights of minorities.2 The emerging counter-defamation discourse 
introduces new grounds for limiting human rights, notably with respect 
to the right to freedom of expression––limitations that are not recognized 
by international law. It is largely intrinsic to religious belief to deem all 
contradicting, unorthodox, or otherwise deviant religious doctrine and 
religious manifestations as, if not “heretical,” then at least erroneous, 
misguided, or misdirected. Accordingly, in any pluralist society where 
more than one religion is practiced, an intensified focus on protecting 
religions against defamation may very well be counterproductive as far 
as the right to freedom of religion or belief itself is concerned. The 
examples of the persecution of numerous “deviant” or “break-away” 
sects, or of individual “heretics,” in different parts of the world, done in 
the interest of safeguarding “pure” religious orthodoxy, are striking.  
In sum, the counter-defamation discourse is not the appropriate way 
of dealing with contemporary issues of religious intolerance. 
Specifically, the counter-defamation approach is unacceptable because it 
seeks to shift the emphasis from the protection of the rights of 
individuals to the protection of religions per se. In so doing, new grounds 
for limiting human rights are introduced that are not and should not be 
recognized by international human rights law (e.g., respect for religions 
or respect for people’s religious feelings) because such restrictions are 
open to governmental abuse.  
The question that we must then answer is how we can solve the 
challenges posed by religious sensitivities in religiously pluralist 
societies. The answer, which is seen in international monitoring bodies, 
the consensus of independent human rights experts, and legal doctrine, 
boils down to recognizing that adequate legal standards are already in 
place to deal with free speech and with the possible limitations thereto in 
 
 2. See, e.g., Sejal Parmar, The Challenge of “Defamation of Religions” to Freedom of 
Expression and the International Human Rights System, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV [E.H.R.L.R.], 
353, 354 (2009); Julian Rivers, The Question of Freedom of Religion or Belief and Defamation, 2 
RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 113, 115 (2007); Aurel Sari, The Danish Cartoons Row: Re-Drawing the 
Limits of the Right to Freedom of Expression?, 16 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 363, ¶ VI (2005); Jeroen 
Temperman, Blasphemy, Defamation of Religions & Human Rights Law, 26(4) NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 
517, 530–533 (2008); Allison G. Belnap, Comment, Defamation of Religions: A Vague and 
Overbroad Theory that Threatens Basic Human Rights, 2010 BYU L. REV. 635, 642–685; Rebecca 
J. Dobras, Note, Is the United Nations Endorsing Human Rights Violations?: An Analysis of the 
United Nations’ Combating Defamation of Religious Resolutions and Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws, 
37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339, 366–380 (2009); Maxim Grinberg, Note, Defamation of Religions 
v. Freedom of Expression: Finding the Balance in a Democratic Society, 18 SRI LANKA J. INT’L L. 
197, 210–222 (2006).  
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the event of extreme speech.3 Specifically, there is no need for additional 
bans in addition to the ones presently recognized by international law. In 
short, we need to work with the existing standards and existing limitation 
clauses and further gear these instruments towards newly emerging 
challenges, such as the interplay between freedom of expression and 
religious sensitivities in pluralist societies. This Article asks to what 
extent international monitoring bodies succeed in using the existing 
structures to deal with emerging challenges, and inquires into what states 
may learn from these international benchmarks, expert opinions, and 
relevant case law.  
II. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING DO WITHOUT A 
HATE SPEECH PROHIBITION 
The European Court of Human Rights has taken a somewhat 
unconvincing and rather incoherent approach to cases revolving around 
freedom of expression and religious sensitivities in pluralist societies. 
Specifically, the Court often––although a few notable exceptions can be 
identified4––fails to distinguish between forms of criticism or insult that 
do and those that do not actually jeopardize public order and/or the rights 
and freedoms of others, notably their religious rights.5 This distinction 
 
 3. I.e., both freedom of expression and the prohibition of advocacy of hatred are enshrined 
in international law. Expert bodies increasingly engage head-on with the interplay between these two 
interrelated norms (see infra Part III, particularly the drafting by the Human Rights Committee of a 
new General Comment on freedom of expression, which will also deal with the issue of hate 
speech). Political bodies have occasionally recognized the existence of these complimentary norms. 
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)E (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(noting that all “human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech,” but requiring states to police against 
incitement to discrimination). 
 4. See, e.g., Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00, 2006-I 45 Eur. H. R. Rep. 23 (2006), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “Case-law,” then “Decisions and judgments,” then 
“HUDOC,” select “decisions” on the left-hand column, and search for application number 
64016/00). In this case the Court held that a scholar’s critical analysis of Catholic doctrine, shocking 
to religious adherents particularly on account of the proposed link made to the origins of the 
Holocaust and the proposed linkage between Catholic doctrine and anti-Semitism more generally, 
should, according to the Court, not have been limited by France as this type of religious criticism is 
protected speech, and as, among other reasons, the berated publications did not amount to hate 
speech (some of the other reasons here listed by the Court seem beside the point, though). Id. ¶ 52. 
The former European Commission on Human Rights did on at least one occasion point out that 
criticism of religion under circumstances must be protected rather than countered by states. See 
Church of Scientology and 128 of its Members v Sweden, App. No. 8282/78, 21 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 109 (1980). In this case the Commission stated that it “is not of the opinion that a 
particular creed or confession can derive from the concept of freedom of religion a right to be free 
from criticism.” Id. at 111. 
 5. See, e.g., X. Ltd. and Y. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8710/79, 28 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
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would be helpful since it can be argued that only verbal attacks that 
actually do jeopardize public order and/or the rights and freedoms of 
others may legitimately be restricted.6  
More particularly, three trends discernable in the Court’s 
jurisprudence are rather helpful from a human rights perspective: 
(A) the Court’s gradual development of a “right not to be 
insulted in one’s religious feelings;” 
(B) the Court’s failure to realize that there is no conflict between 
freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression in 
abstracto;  
(C) the Court’s sanctioning of inherently discriminatory laws. 
These trends will be discussed in the following portion of the Article. 
A. The Court’s Development of a “Right Not to Be Insulted in One’s 
Religious Feelings” 
In its early case law, the European Court of Human Rights took an 
overly extensive reading of freedom of religion or belief so as to limit the 
freedom of expression. In a series of cases, the Court held that Article 9 
of the European Convention on Human Rights7 includes, inter alia, a 
“right not to be insulted in one’s religious feelings.”8 This interpretation 
 
Dec. & Rep. 77 (1982); Otto Preminger-Institute v. Austria, 19 Eur. H. R. Rep. (ser. A) 34 (1994), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “Case-law,” then “Decisions and judgments,” then 
“HUDOC,” select “decisions” on the left-hand column, and search for application number 
13470/87); Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H. R. Rep. 1 (1996), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “Case-law,” then “Decisions and judgments,” then “HUDOC,” 
select “decisions” on the left-hand column, and search for application number 17419/90); Murphy v. 
Ireland, 38 Eur. H. R. Rep. 13 (2003), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “Case-law,” 
then “Decisions and judgments,” then “HUDOC,” select “decisions” on the left-hand column, and 
search for application number 44179/98);. For a more extensive discussion of these cases, see Jeroen 
Temperman, Blasphemy, Defamation of Religions & Human Rights Law, 26 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 
517, 533–544 (2008). 
 6. But see, e.g., Otto Preminger-Institute, 19 Eur. H. R. Rep. (ser. A) 34, at ¶ 48, indicating 
that persons have a right not to be insulted in their religious belief. Reading this right into Article 9 
of the European Convention on Human Rights is dubious. See infra Part II.A. 
 7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
 8. See, e.g., X. Ltd. and Y., 28 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 28 Dec. & Rep. at 83 (“the right of 
citizens not to be offended in their religious feelings by publications”); Otto Preminger-Institute, 19 
Eur. H. R. Rep. (ser. A) 34, at ¶ 48, (“the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious 
feelings”); Wingrove, 24 Eur. H. R. Rep. 1, at ¶ 47, (“the right of citizens not to be insulted in their 
religious feelings”). In other cases, the notion of respect for the religious doctrines and beliefs of 
others is not recognized as a right as such, but is nonetheless considered as a recognized ground for 
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of religious freedom creates absurd results, as it means that there is 
virtually always a clash of rights—that is, freedom of religion vs. 
freedom of expression—whenever someone expresses anything remotely 
critical of religion. Long-established legal doctrines provide that the right 
to freedom of religion or belief encompasses the freedom to have or 
adopt a religion or belief (the so-called forum internum) and the freedom 
to manifest that religion or belief (the forum externum).9 As a result, if a 
person is insulted in his or her religious feelings, that person’s religious 
freedoms are not ipso facto violated. Thus, international human rights 
law does not recognize the right to have one’s religion or belief at all 
times exempted from criticism, ridicule, or insult, or the right to have 
one’s religious feelings respected.10 Put differently, the right to freedom 
of religion or belief does not by implication place a duty on all people to 
at all times have respect for everyone’s religion or belief. For a state to 
legitimately interfere with a shocking or offensive speech or publication, 
a much higher threshold will need to be satisfied than the assertion that 
certain people have been shocked or insulted or that people are likely to 
be shocked or insulted.  
B. The Court’s Failure to Realize that there is No Conflict Between 
Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Expression In Abstracto 
In more recent cases, the European Court of Human Rights, 
recognizing the need for a higher threshold than shocking a religious 
person’s conscience, has revised its approach in deciding religious 
expression cases. Specifically, the Court seems to be abandoning the 
right not to be insulted in one’s religious feelings. Instead, it increasingly 
refers to the literal, codified grounds for limiting freedom of expression, 
which include phrases from Article 9(2) of the European Convention 
such as “public safety,” “public order,” “health,” “morals,” or “the 
 
limiting free speech. See, e.g., Murphy, 38 Eur. H. R. Rep. 13, at ¶¶ 63–64 (“[T]he prohibition 
sought to ensure respect for the religious doctrines and beliefs of others so that the aims of the 
impugned provision were public order and safety together with the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. . . . The Court does not see any reason to doubt that these were indeed the aims 
of the impugned legislation and considers that they constituted legitimate aims . . . .”). 
 9. See Brett G. Scharffs, The Freedom of Religion and Belief Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights: Legal, Moral, Political and Religious Perspectives, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 
249, 255 (2011). 
 10. See Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Implementation of General 
Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/2/3 at ¶ 36 (Sept. 20, 2006) (by Asma Jahangir and Doudou Diène). 
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protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”11 In the context of cases 
revolving around free speech and religious sensitivities of third persons, 
it is clear that “public order” and “the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others” may at times be relevant. The protection of the right 
to freedom of religion or belief of a third person is most definitely a 
legitimate ground for limiting free speech, but it should not be equated 
with a right not to be insulted in one’s religious feelings.12 For a speech 
or publication to actually affect someone’s fundamental (religious) 
rights, we enter the realm of “extreme speech.” This ground for 
limitation, as is the case with any ground for limitation, cannot be 
advanced by a state without at least some sort of substantiation, the onus 
here being on the state to establish that fundamental rights and/or public 
order are truly at stake.13 
In recent cases, the Court identified the rights of others to freedom of 
religion as a legitimate ground for limitation, rather than relying on the 
dubious right not to be insulted.14 However, the Court recognized in 
these cases that there indeed was a clash of rights and that a balance 
needed to be struck.15 It is not enough for a state to submit that the 
religious rights of others are at stake; rather, the state needs to indicate 
concretely why the religious rights are at stake. Moreover, as we are 
dealing with possible limits to the paramount democratic right to 
freedom of expression, some marginal assessment of that justification by 
the Court would seem to be in order.  
The leap from the likelihood of people being insulted by a certain 
publication or public speech to the rights of these people being 
effectively undermined must also be considered. The Court is probably 
 
 11. See Scharffs, supra note 9, at 249 (“During the past fifteen years, the European Court of 
Human Rights has been engaging seriously with the freedom of religion and belief under Article 9 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”). 
 12. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 13. JEROEN TEMPERMAN, STATE-RELIGION RELATIONSHIPS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
TOWARDS A RIGHT TO RELIGIOUSLY NEUTRAL GOVERNANCE 252 (2010). 
 14. See, e.g., I.A. v. Turkey, 45 Eur. H. R. Rep. 30, ¶¶ 23–32 (2005), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “Case-law,” then “Decisions and judgments,” then “HUDOC,” 
select “decisions” on the left-hand column, and search for application number 42571/98). 
 15. For an exception, see Klein v. Slovakia, 50 Eur. H. R. Rep. 15 (2006), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “Case-law,” then “Decisions and judgments,” then “HUDOC,” 
select “decisions” on the left-hand column, and search for application number 72208/01). In this case 
the Court concluded that a verbal attack on a high representative of the Roman Catholic Church 
could not have threatened the religious rights of individuals, meaning that the fundamental religious 
rights of others could not be relied on as legitimate ground for limiting the applicant’s free speech. 
Id. ¶¶ 52–54.  
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right to look into demographic figures on the percentage of the 
population that adheres to certain religions as part of its analysis, but it 
could also be argued that the Court’s use of them is counter-intuitive at 
best. For example, in I.A. v. Turkey, the fact that many people were 
active, Muslim believers added weight to their arguments that their 
religious rights were being threatened by disturbing, shocking, or 
provocative statements on Islam.16 One could easily reverse the 
argument: if the overwhelming majority of a society adheres to one and 
the same religion, a perhaps shocking view presented by an outsider is 
not likely to undermine any person’s individual religious rights. 
Demographic figures can certainly come into play in this type of 
balancing, yet it would seem that they are only appropriate if they 
substantiate that the group of people targeted by a speech or publication 
is a vulnerable minority,17 or if the statistics show that the group at hand 
does indeed suffer from hate crimes or other similar persecution. In those 
cases, such data could arguably be construed to add weight to the 
pressing social need to interfere with free speech.  
In the classic Otto Preminger case, concerning Austria’s seizure and 
forfeiture of a film that was no doubt blasphemous, the Court made the 
same error when it reasoned that  
[t]he Court cannot disregard the fact that the Roman Catholic religion is 
the religion of the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans. In seizing the 
film, the Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that 
region and to prevent that some people should feel the object of attacks 
on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner.18  
Again, the reverse argument seems the strongest one: as the local 
population overwhelmingly adhered to this dominant majority, their 
individual rights were never going to be undermined by a small-scale art 
cinema screening of this film. Of course, in these types of circumstances 
there is always the chance that the majority’s outrage may, in fact, 
 
 16. I.A. v. Turkey, 45 Eur. H. R. Rep. 30 at ¶¶ 20–29. Thus, the Court seems to endorse to an 
extent the Turkish Government’s views: “The Government submitted that the applicant's conviction 
had met a pressing social need in that the book in issue had contained an abusive attack on religion, 
in particular Islam, and had offended and insulted religious feelings. They argued in that connection 
that the criticism of Islam in the book had fallen short of the level of responsibility to be expected of 
criticism in a country where the majority of the population were Muslim.” Id. at ¶ 20. 
 17. See Nazila Ghanea, Minorities and Hatred: Protections and Implications, 17 INT. J. ON 
MINORITY AND GROUP RTS. 423, 432–436 (2010). 
 18. Otto Preminger-Institute v. Austria, 19 Eur. H. R. Rep. (ser. A) 34, at ¶ 56 (1994), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “Case-law,” then “Decisions and judgments,” then 
“HUDOC,” select “decisions” on the left-hand column, and search for application number 13470/8). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:49 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
736 
actually threaten the rights of the person(s) responsible for the speech, 
publication, or film, but such could not naturally be construed as a 
“rights-of-others” argument. If anything, this scenario provides a “public 
order” argument. However, in a democratic society there are very good 
reasons for the state to take additional measures to protect such 
unpopular speech (and the persons behind it) rather than to limit it. 
To an extent, this criticism applies to the Court’s “Holocaust denial” 
case law as well.19 In those cases revolving around denial or 
trivialization of the Holocaust, the Court has more or less equated 
Holocaust denial with incitement to discrimination. In the Garaudy case, 
the Court considered: 
There can be no doubt that denying the reality of clearly established 
historical facts, such as the Holocaust, as the applicant does in his book, 
does not constitute historical research akin to a quest for the truth. The 
aim and the result of that approach are completely different, the real 
purpose being to rehabilitate the National-Socialist regime and, as a 
consequence, accuse the victims themselves of falsifying history. 
Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious 
forms of racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. 
The denial or rewriting of this type of historical fact undermines the 
values on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based 
and constitutes a serious threat to public order. Such acts are 
incompatible with democracy and human rights because they infringe 
the rights of others.20 
On the one hand, surely one must appreciate where the Court is coming 
from; insofar as the entire contemporary human rights framework stems 
from the horrors of the Holocaust, a denial of it equals a denial of 
everything that framework stands for. On the other hand, the Court’s 
automatic, self-evident correlation between Holocaust denial and the 
denier’s active undermining of the rights of others perhaps boils down to 
overrating the impact of such statements while at the same time 
underrating a democratic society’s capability of identifying both the truth 
and the grotesque.  
 
 19. Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX. Eur. Ct. H.R. 369 (2003), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ 
(click “case law” then “Decisions and judgments,” then “HUDOC,” select “decisions” on the left-
hand column, and search for application number 65831/01) 
 20. Id. at ¶ 40. In the earlier case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France App. No. 
55/1997/839/1045, at ¶ 47, the Court had similarly considered that in “the category of clearly 
established historical facts—such as the Holocaust” speech or publications that come down to a 
“negation or revision [are to be] removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17.” 
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C. The Court’s Sanctioning of Inherently Discriminatory Laws 
In dealing with freedom of expression and religious sensitivities in 
pluralist societies, the European Court of Human Rights has never 
convincingly dealt with blasphemy or defamation prohibitions that are 
inherently discriminatory in that they de jure or de facto apply only to 
protect the predominant religion.21 It is hard to see how an inherently 
discriminatory law could ever form the basis for restrictions “necessary 
in a democratic society.” 
D. Reconceptualizing the “Abuse of Rights” Doctrine? 
The challenge of dealing with religious sensitivities in pluralist 
societies, and particularly the Court’s noted difficulties in distinguishing 
genuine hate speech from shocking-yet-protected speech within the 
European context, is significantly fueled by the fact that the European 
Convention does not entail a proper religious hate speech prohibition.22 
That is to say, in the European Convention one will look in vain for the 
equivalent of Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR or “the Covenant”), which codifies the duty for 
the state to prohibit advocacy of religious hatred (see the discussion in 
Part III, infra), to provide assistance in answering these difficulties.23 
However, different, but possibly complimentary, solutions to 
circumventing this omission are imaginable: (1) “reading” a hate speech 
prohibition “into” Article 10(2) of the European Convention;24 and (2) 
 
 21. Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H. R. Rep. 1, at ¶ 50 (1996), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “Case-law,” then “Decisions and judgments,” then “HUDOC,” 
select “decisions” on the left-hand column, and search for application number 17419/90) (“It is true 
that the English law of blasphemy only extends to the Christian faith 
. . . . The uncontested fact that the law of blasphemy does not treat on an equal footing the different 
religions practised in the United Kingdom does not detract from the legitimacy of the aim pursued in 
the present context.”). Note that England itself has come to the conclusion that its ancient blasphemy 
laws were inherently discriminatory and contrary to free speech, and abolished these laws in 2008. 
See Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, 2008, c. 4, § 79 (Eng.). 
 22. Jeroen Temperman, Protection Against Religious Hatred Under the United Nations 
ICCPR and the European Convention System, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES at 222 (Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo 
Cristofoi eds., 2010).  
 23. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI)A (Dec. 16, 1966); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 24. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, What is a Community? Group Rights and the 
Constitution: The Special Case of African Americans, 1 MARGINS: MD. INTERDISC. PUB. ON RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER, AND CLASS 51, 70 n.107 (2001) (“Article 10 of the European Convention 
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reconceptualizing the abuse of rights doctrine.
 25 
1. Reading a hate speech prohibition into Article 10(2) of the European 
Convention 
One could possibly read a hate speech prohibition into Article 10(2) 
of the European Convention, which lists recognized grounds for the 
limitation of speech, as either a public order ground or as part of the 
“fundamental rights and freedoms of others” ground (e.g. the right of 
others to be free from discrimination).26 The downside of this approach, 
however, is that it risks being accused of precisely that which the 
European Court of Human Right’s past jurisprudence may be accused of, 
namely, reading into the European Convention notions that are not 
actually enshrined (e.g., the rights of others not to be insulted).  
However, the human rights framework is explicitly premised upon 
the assumption that a society should be free from hatred, discrimination, 
and marginalization.27 Accordingly, this implied ground for limitation 
does not require an enormous leap of faith. By comparison, the UN 
Human Rights Committee has indeed derived from the ICCPR a “right to 
be protected from religious hatred.”28 However, it could, of course, base 
itself on the existence of Article 20(2) ICCPR for that purpose. 
Essentially, the Committee has taken a positive reading of a negatively 
formulated norm; that is to say, it has distilled an individual right from a 
prohibition addressed at states.  
2. Reconceptualizing the abuse of rights doctrine 
Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, the time may be appropriate to 
reconceptualize and revitalize the abuse of rights doctrine. This notion is 
not unique to the European Convention,29 but could have special legal 
significance here, since it is the only provision in the European 
 
contains a limitation on freedom of expression that has been interpreted to prohibit hate speech.” ). 
 25. TEMPERMAN, supra note 13, at 336. 
 26. See Banks, supra note 24, at 70 n.107. 
 27. See generally Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance: Follow-up to and Implementation of 
the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/12/38 (July 1, 2009) (by Githu Muigai). 
 28. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 736/1997, Malcolm Ross v. 
Canada, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 ¶ 11.5 (2000), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/29712c8ddea3414dc12569ad003d0316?Opendocument. 
 29. See ICCPR, supra note 23, which codifies an abuse of rights provision in Article 5 in 
addition to the prohibition of advocacy of hatred (Article 20). 
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Convention that has language that specifically addresses situations in 
which the activities of people may be construed as being aimed at the 
destruction of the rights and freedoms of others.30 Article 17 of the 
European Convention reads in full:  
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and  
 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the Convention.31 
One important caveat is that not all hate speech cases can be 
discussed under this heading. This approach could only possibly apply to 
potential hate speech cases brought before the Court by persons alleging 
to have suffered interference with their free speech (e.g., if a person had 
been imprisoned, fined, fired, or otherwise punished on account of their 
alleged hate speech). Moreover, cases referred to the Court by alleged 
victims of hate speech naturally cannot be dealt with under this article.
32 
Again, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has derived from 
the ICCPR a “right to be protected from religious hatred.”
33
 Should that 
notion, once Article 20(2) ICCPR has been further elaborated upon by 
the Human Rights Committee,34 be construed to mean an autonomous 
fundamental right, it could then very well be argued that people may 
bring a case before the Committee complaining that states have not taken 
sufficient measures to eradicate advocacy of religious hatred. Though it 
remains to be seen whether the Committee’s conceptualization of Article 
 
 30. The former European Commission on Human Rights did realize this. See, e.g., 
Glimmerveen & Hagenbeek v. The Netherlands, 18 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 187 (1979). 
 31. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 7, Art. 17. 
 32. Article 17 of the ECHR does not provide an individual entitlement, but a general 
limitation to the scope of the rights set out by the Convention. In a sense, Article 17 sets out what 
right does not exist, namely the “right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms.” Id. As such, this provision does not appear to be an 
individual entitlement that can be invoked by individuals before the Court, for instance by 
individuals who claim they are the victims of hate speech. Indeed, the case law of the Court shows 
that Article 17 has not yet been successfully invoked by an alleged victim of hate speech. Article 17 
thus far has only featured in the case law of the court so as to deny standing to persons claiming that 
their free speech has been interfered with, or in decisions on the merits, so as to add weight to the 
argument that the state did not breach the right to freedom of expression of the applicant. 
 33. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 736/1997, Malcolm Ross v. Canada, U.N. 
Doc CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 ¶ 11.5 (2000), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/29712c8ddea3414dc12569ad003d0316?Opendocument. 
 34. See discussion infra Part III. 
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20(2) ICCPR will indeed make such cases possible in the future, any 
such development under Article 17 of the European Convention seems to 
be ruled out from the outset. Article 17 is intended to reject certain 
human rights claims, namely those which are made with a view towards 
destroying the rights of others.35  
This leads to a second caveat. Specifically, a potential drawback of 
an approach that consistently dismisses relevant claims on the basis of 
the abuse of rights doctrine is that it tends to avoid a body of 
jurisprudence dealing with the merits of such hate speech cases. Judicial 
practice thus far is that abuse of rights concerns are dealt with as an 
admissibility issue, not as part of a judicial exercise of balancing 
different rights. Article 35(3)(a) of the European Convention, too, refers 
back to an “abuse of the right of individual application” as one of the 
grounds for declaring a case inadmissible.36 The fact that the abuse of 
rights prohibition is actually codified as part of the section listing the 
substantive rights and freedoms could be used to argue in favor of 
consideration of the merits of complaints here, rather than in favor of 
prima facie considerations of the admissibility of a case per se.37 In sum, 
“abuse of rights” concerns are ideally always tackled as a part of a 
discussion of the merits (i.e., in conjunction with the standard discussion 
of relevant grounds for limitation under Article 10(2), and of the criteria 
applicable to those restrictions).  
  
 
 35. Consequently, this provision does not seem to set out any substantive rights in addition to 
the ones codified by Articles 2–14 of the European Convention. However, arguably some legal 
significance could be derived from the fact that the abuse of rights prohibition is codified as a part of 
the treaty section listing the substantive rights and freedoms. See Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights, supra note 7, § I (entitled “Rights and freedoms”). 
 36. Id. at Art. 35(3)(a). 
 37. It must be noted that a (partial) focus on Article 17 of the European Convention in, for 
instance, the Court’s Holocaust denial case law (Garaudy v. France) did lead to indirect yet rather 
extensive considerations of the merits of the case (even though strictly speaking it was an 
admissibility case)—a sensible compromise. However, the fact that the Court presently seems only 
to be prepared to engage Article 17 in the context of Holocaust denial cases, and not in the context of 
other apparent instances of racist or hate speech can be criticized. See David Keane, Attacking Hate 
Speech Under Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 25 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS 641, 
641–663 (2007) available at: 
http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/Library/books.nsf/a75c937fd931aed7c125678d003c11fc/63924554ca2d93c
cc12573a7003000d9?OpenDocument. Also, for a comprehensive discussion of all extreme speech 
cases thus far in which Article 17 was alone, or in conjunction with Article 10(2), seized upon by the 
Court, see id. 
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III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND THE REDISCOVERY OF THE 
PROHIBITION OF ADVOCACY OF RELIGIOUS HATRED  
A. The Role of the Prohibition of Advocacy of Religious Hatred: A First 
Glance 
Although Article 20(2) of the ICCPR formulates a clear duty for 
each state party to the Covenant to adopt legislation prohibiting religious 
hate speech,38 until recently little activity on the part of the Human 
Rights Committee to scrutinize whether states actually complied with 
that norm could be noted. Article 20(2) provides that “[a]ny advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”39 In 
recent Views (opinions regarding individual communications) and 
Concluding Observations (opinions regarding state reports),40 the 
Committee seems to have rediscovered this legal notion. Particularly in 
its draft General Comment on freedom of expression,41 which is to be 
adopted in 2011, the Committee seems determined to conceptualize the 
prohibition of religious hatred so as to deal with extreme speech more 
actively and effectively––and, arguably, at the same time so as to 
differentiate this type of extreme  
 
 
 38. ICCPR, supra note 23, Art. 20(2). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, Human Rights Comm., 67th Sess., ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY (Nov. 28, 2002) 
(“The Committee is deeply concerned at the State party’s failure to take action following the 
publication of some very violent articles against the Jews in the Egyptian press, which in fact 
constitute advocacy of racial and religious hatred and incitement to discrimination, hostility and 
violence.”); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 
Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003) (“The 
Committee is concerned by public pronouncements made by several prominent Israeli personalities 
in relation to Arabs that may constitute advocacy of racial and religious hatred constituting 
incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence. The State party should take the necessary action 
to investigate, prosecute and punish such acts in order to ensure respect for article 20, paragraph 2, 
of the Covenant.”) Earlier statements include, Report of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 181, U.N. 
Doc. A/50/40; GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1995) (“The Committee is concerned about the fact 
that, while the Human Rights Act contains a provision corresponding to article 20, paragraph 2, of 
the Covenant, this provision does not include a prohibition of advocacy of religious hatred”); Id. ¶ 
322.  
 41. Draft General Comment No. 34, Human Rights Comm., 100th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.5 (Nov. 25, 2010). This version represents the Committee’s opinions after the 
first so-called “reading” by the Human Rights Committee; see also the version discussed earlier 
during that same session: CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.4 (Oct. 22, 2010). 
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speech from blasphemy/defamation of religion, which as a rule must be 
protected rather than countered by states. 
The advantage of assessing speeches or publications in light of the 
hate speech prohibition is clear: instead of taking subjective factors such 
as insult as a point of departure, more objective factors can be scrutinized 
in order to judge whether a state rightly interfered with the applicants’ 
free speech. That is to say, the center of gravity of legal assessment 
becomes the actual speech and the reaction or potential reaction of the 
group or persons addressed by the speech—not the reaction or potential 
reaction of the targeted group itself.  
To illustrate, Ross v. Canada42 concerned a teacher propagating anti-
Semitic sentiments. In this case, the Committee reasoned that the 
teacher’s right could reasonably be restricted on the basis of the rights 
and reputations of others, more specifically the right of the pupils to be 
protected from religious hatred.43 Reading Article 19 of the ICCPR in 
conjunction with Article 20(2), the Committee reasoned that restrictions 
are, in principle, permitted on statements which are of such a nature as to 
raise or strengthen hostile feelings vis-à-vis adherents of a certain 
religion.44 Scrutinizing not so much the question of whether pupils or 
parents were hurt in their religious feelings, but rather whether or not the 
berated publications could objectively threaten the rights of others, the 
Committee established that the rights of Jewish pupils were indeed at 
stake.45 The Committee came to that conclusion on the basis of a textual 
analysis of the publications and in light of the actual social context in 
which statements were made. 
In that respect two things were important to the Committee. First, the 
author’s statements did not merely denigrate Judaism, but actually 
“called upon true Christians . . . to hold those of the Jewish faith and 
ancestry in contempt as undermining freedom, democracy, and Christian 
beliefs and values” (i.e., an objective incitement element).46 Second, the 
Committee was concerned about the reaction or potential reaction of 
persons that read the publications—the group or persons targeted by the 
publication (i.e., is the publication of such a nature that people may 
 
 42. Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 736/1997, Malcolm Ross v. Canada, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
tbs/doc.nsf/0/29712c8ddea3414dc12569ad003d0316?Opendocument. 
 43. Id. at ¶ 11.5. 
 44. Id. at ¶ 11.6. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at ¶ 11.5. 
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indeed be incited to act upon it, thus threatening the rights of the people 
targeted by the publication?).47 Posing this question meant that the 
Committee was not satisfied with the mere fact that a relevant, 
recognized limitation of the freedom of expression can in abstracto be 
advanced;
48
 rather, it is essential to inquire into the necessity of the 
interference. In this particular case, the Human Rights Committee 
confirmed the existence of a “poisoned school environment,”49 thus 
establishing the necessity to interfere with the teacher’s publications.  
B. The Need for Further Conceptualization of the Prohibition of 
Advocacy of Religious Hatred 
Thus, prima facie the advantages of the countering-hate-speech 
approach as compared to the combating-all-forms-of-defamation 
approach seem to be as follows. First, the mechanism is already in place, 
meaning we do not need to conceive of new prohibitions to deal with 
extreme speech in the religiously pluralist society. This legal norm does 
the most justice to both freedom of expression and freedom of religion, 
insofar as this approach would only consider “balancing” rights when 
there is a real or imminent clash of rights. Second, hate speech can be 
objectified to a greater extent than religious defamation; accordingly, 
there would be less scope for governmental abuse. 
However, stopping our analysis here would be an oversimplification 
since international case law and benchmarks on religious hate speech are 
very scarce. Consequently, many legal issues remain unresolved and as 
long as these issues are unresolved, a “combating-hate-speech approach” 
may be equally abused. Additionally, state practice at the national level 
is fairly new and tentative, and ostensibly not well-informed by 
international benchmarks––essentially, again, because until very recently 
there hardly were any benchmarks.  
 
 
States have opted for widely varying laws and policies. A number of 
states, mostly liberal democracies, have fairly recently started 
implementing and experimenting with religious hate speech legislation. 
In some of these countries, the political discussion leading up to this type 
 
 47. Id. at ¶ 11.6. 
 48.  Here the ground for limitation is the rights of others. 
 49. Id. (following earlier observations made by the Canadian Supreme Court and a domestic 
Board of Inquiry in paragraphs 4.6 and 4.7).  
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of legislation revolved around the question of how tenable blasphemy 
bills remain today.50 For example, in the U.K., the enacting of hate 
speech legislation went more or less hand-in-hand with striking the 
blasphemy offense from the statutes.51 In some states, however, hate 
speech legislation has not replaced blasphemy legislation but rather 
complements the latter. The Netherlands is a good example; incitement 
to hatred was initially supposed to replace the penal provision on 
blasphemy, but eventually it was simply added.52  
Many other notable differences among domestic legislation can be 
discerned. Some states have adopted fairly elaborate hate speech 
legislation,
53
 whilst others have included more generic clauses in their 
penal codes (e.g., Canada,54 Croatia,55 Denmark,56 Finland,57 
 
 50. See the examples of the U.K. and the Netherlands, infra. Also in Ireland, the Irish Law 
Reform Commission has deemed the Irish blasphemy offense untenable. This Commission is “of the 
view that there is no place for the offense of blasphemous libel in a society which respects freedom 
of speech” and has consequently advised its abolishment. See, LAW REFORM COMM’N, 
CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE CRIME OF LIBEL, ¶ 231, (Aug. 1991), available at 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation papers/ cpCrimeofLibel.htm. In Ireland, however, 
blasphemy has not yet been struck from the statutes. See TEMPERMAN, supra note 13 at 239–240. 
For a comparative legal analysis of domestic blasphemy bills around the world, see Temperman, 
Blasphemy, Defamation of Religions & Human Rights Law, supra note 5, at 519 et. seq. (section II).  
 51. Blasphemy and blasphemous libel were abolished as common law offenses in May 2008 
as per Article 79 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (c. 4) (the abolishment entered 
into effect on 8 July 2008). Some months earlier, on 5 March 2008, the House of Lords had voted in 
favor of the amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill as proposed by the Government. A House of 
Lords’ Select Committee on Religious Offences paved the way towards abolishment of the 
blasphemy offense as it considered the legal concept both obsolete as well as, in the final analysis, 
contrary to fundamental human rights norms (notably, freedom of expression). See House of Lords’ 
Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, Religious Offences in England and 
Wales: First Report, Session 2002–2003 (published in HL Paper 95-I, 2003), particularly at ¶¶ 2–13 
of Appendix 3. The prohibition of incitement to racial and religious hatred was introduced as per the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (c. 1). 
 52. See Article 137d of the Dutch Penal Code (hate speech). In 2009, a majority in the Dutch 
Parliament expressed itself in favor of striking blasphemy from the Dutch criminal code. See, e.g., 
NRC, Tweede Kamer wil Verbod op Godslastering uit Wetboek (Jan. 20, 2009), 
http://vorige.nrc.nl/binnenland/article2126748.ece/Tweede_Kamer_wil_verbod_op_ 
godslastering_uit_wetboek. Initially, the plan was to replace the blasphemy offense with hate 
speech, see, e.g., EXPATICA.COM, Dutch to Remove Blasphemy from Penal Code, (Nov. 1, 2008) 
http://www.expatica.com/nl/news/dutch-news/Dutch-to-remove-blasphemy-from-penal-
code_47071.html. Ultimately, however, both offenses were enshrined in the Dutch Penal code. See 
Art. 147 and Art. 147a (on blasphemy and religious defamation), Art. 137c (on group defamation) 
and Art. 137d (incitement to hatred) of the Dutch Penal Code. Articles 147 and 147a on blasphemy 
and religious defamation, however, are de facto fairly dead letters. 
   53. The UK would again be a good example of this. 
 54. Art. 319 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S., 1985, c. C-46. Note that blasphemous 
libel, too, is criminalized (Art. 296). 
 55. Art. 174(3) of the Criminal Code of Croatia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia 
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Germany,58 India,59 Netherlands,60 Serbia,61 and Sweden62).63 Further, 
some of the Nordic states increasingly employ ancient defamation laws 
de facto to counter religious hate speech, providing judges with the task 
of interpreting existing laws in “treaty-conforming” ways.64 Still, other 
states ban particular types of extreme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
speech (e.g., the “denial laws” adopted by Austria,65 Belgium,66 and 
 
No. 110 of Oct. 21, 1997. This provision covers the prohibition of religious hatred (among other 
prohibited forms of promoting hatred). 
 56. Art. 266b of the Criminal Code of Denmark. This provision on the dissemination of 
statements that are threatening to identified (religious, racial, etc.) groups was inserted in 1971 in 
conjunction with Denmark’s ratification of ICERD, which prohibits advocacy of racial hatred in Art. 
4. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 
2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965), 660 
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). See country entry for Denmark: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/ 
articles1920_iccpr/docs/ViennaWorkshop/Denmark.pdf. 
 57. Section 10 of Ch. 6 of the Criminal Code of Finland prohibits “ethnic agitation,” which 
prohibition also protects “religious groups.”  
 58. Section 130 of the German Criminal Code (1998) prohibits incitement to “hatred against 
segments of the population.” 
 59. Section 153A of the Criminal Code of India prohibits promoting enmity between 
different groups on grounds of religion, race, place or birth, residence, language, caste, or 
community. 
 60. See Art. 137d of the Dutch Criminal Code, as discussed infra. 
 61. Art. 317 of the Criminal Code of Serbia (2005) prohibits the promotion of national, 
religious, or racial hatred. 
 62. Section 8 of Chapter 16 of the Criminal Code of Sweden prohibits ethnic “agitation,” but 
also refers to “religious belief” as one of the prohibited grounds in the contexts of disseminating 
statements which threaten certain groups.  
 63. For more examples, see the country information collected by the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights available at http://www2.ohchr.org/ 
english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/annexes_study_country_info.htm. 
 64. See Ghanea, Minorities and Hatred, supra note 17 at 438 (discussing Norwegian judicial 
practice). 
 65. Section 3h of the Verbotsgesetz 1947 (Prohibition Act 1947, amended 1992, available at 
http://www.nachkriegsjustiz.at/service/gesetze/gs_vg_3_1992.php). 
 66. Loi tendant à réprimer la négation, la minimisation, la justification ou l’approbation du 
génocide commis par le régime national-socialiste allemand pendant la seconde guerre mondiale 
[Law aimed at punishing the denial, minimization, justification, or approval of genocide by the 
German Nazi regime during World War II], Law of Mar. 23 1995 (amended 1999). See also Article 
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France67).
 
 
Clearly, different states face different challenges and, as a result, it is 
to some extent logical that state practice is still rather “tentative.” 
However, from the perspective of legal certainty, it is equally clear that 
state practice would greatly benefit from further critical 
conceptualization of freedom of expression and its limits in the 
religiously pluralist state. To achieve these benefits, the relevant human 
rights monitoring bodies, jointly with the independent experts (relevant 
Special Rapporteurs), and legal doctrine will need to:  
 further conceptualize the prohibition of advocacy of 
religious hatred as a notion of international law and, 
more particularly, identify legal benchmarks and factors 
that help determine the phenomenon of “advocacy of 
religious hatred,” so as to contrast it with protected 
forms of blasphemy and defamation; 
 identify the precise state obligations emanating from the 
internationally codified prohibition of “advocacy of 
religious hatred;”68 and,  
 importantly, consider safeguards against governmental 
abuse of hate speech legislation. 
The importance of these actions will now be discussed in the next section 
of the Article. 
  
 
444 of the Penal Code of Belgium.  
 67. Art. 19 of Loi No. 90-615 du 13 juillet 190 tendant à réprimer tout acte raciste, anti-
Semite ou xenophobe [Law No. 90-615 of July 13, 1990 to Suppress Racism, Anti-Semitism, and 
Xenophobia], http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte= 
JORFTEXT000000532990&dateTexte= [“Gayssot Act”]. 
 68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
Art. 20(2) (entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976). 
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1. Further necessary conceptualization 
The first question that must be resolved is defining the precise scope 
of the prohibition by determining what actually constitutes “advocacy of 
religious hatred” within the meaning of article 20(2) of the ICCPR. Since 
the phenomenon of religious hate speech is multi-faceted, religious hate 
speech may analytically be considered either as (1) hate speech vis-à-vis 
a specific religious group or (2) religion-inspired hate speech.  
The first category involves incitement against a religious group, 
typically on the basis of specific characteristics attributed to the 
group/religion in question. One can think of incitement by the secular 
establishment against minority religions newly emerging due to 
migration processes. Religion-inspired hate speech involves incitement 
against persons triggered by one’s interpretations of one’s own belief. 
For instance, consider the following: ultra-orthodox Imams in mosques 
in Western states inciting against “western infidels”;69 Bible-belt priests 
inciting against homosexuals;70 African priests or pastors inciting against 
child witches;71 or “deviant” breakaway sects abandoning orthodoxy 
(e.g. incitement against Ahmadis).72 
However, this issue may be considered merely academic, since the 
Human Rights Committee’s Views and Concluding Observations seem 
to cover both angles. Nevertheless, this issue does raise questions 
concerning domestic processes of enacting hate speech legislation. For 
example, in the Netherlands, the Dutch official version of the ICCPR 
speaks explicitly of advocacy of hatred based on religious motives, 
literally “religiously-based feelings of hatred” (“op . . godsdienst 
gebaseerde haatgevoelens”).73 Dutch domestic hate speech legislation 
itself, on the basis of which Dutch politician Geert Wilders is being 
 
 69. See, e.g., Sam Lister, Imam ‘Instructed British Muslims to Kill Infidels’, THE TIMES (Jan. 
23, 2003), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article853201.ece. 
 70. See, e.g., Rev. Michael Rodriguez, Catholics Must Oppose Sinful Actions, EL PASO 
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.elpasotimes.com/opinion/ci_17297986. 
 71. See, e.g., Nigeria ‘Child Witch Killer’ Held, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2008, 3:35 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7764575.stm; Angola Witchcraft’s Child Victims, BBC NEWS (Jul. 
13, 2005, 1:13 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4677969.stm; Rise in African Children Accused of 
Witchcraft, BBC NEWS (Jul. 17, 2010, 11:34 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
10671790; Mike Thomson, Crisis in DR Congo, BBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2010, 8:35 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/ today/newsid_8530000/8530686.stm. 
 72. See, e.g., Mosque Linked to Hate Campaign Causes Rift in Muslim Community, THIS IS 
LOCAL LONDON (Nov. 3, 2010, 7:20 AM), http://www.thisislocallondon.co.uk/news/ 
8489948.Mosque_linked_to_hate_campaign_causes_rift_in_Muslim_community/. 
 73. ICCPR, supra note 23, at Art. 20. An official Dutch translation of the ICCPR is available 
at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0001017/geldigheidsdatum_11-03-2011# VertalingNL. 
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prosecuted,74 interestingly, is exclusively premised on the need to ban 
hate speech vis-à-vis a specific religious group, regardless of what 
motives are at play. The Dutch Penal Code provides, inter alia, that 
“a[ny] person who publicly, either orally or in writing or by image, 
incites hatred of or discrimination against persons . . . on the grounds of 
their . . . religion or personal belief . . . is liable to a term of 
imprisonment not more than one year or a fine of the third category.”75 
Thus, it appears that the provision prohibits incitement against people on 
account of their adherence to a certain religion. Ostensibly, the provision 
does not cover forms of advocacy of hatred based on one’s own religious 
motives (e.g., religion-inspired hatred against homosexuals). 
This example raises several questions. First, can the Dutch law be 
seen as giving effect to the international prohibition of Article 20(2) of 
the ICCPR? It is, ironically, the Dutch official translation of the ICCPR 
itself that provides that the ICCPR purports to ban advocacy of hatred 
based on religious motives (literally: “religiously-based feelings of 
hatred”). Second, and more importantly, what acts does Article 20(2) of 
the ICCPR actually purport to prohibit? It would appear that the object 
and purpose of the provision on advocacy of religious hatred, and of the 
ICCPR more generally, is to ensure that people can live free from 
marginalization, discrimination, hostility, and violence. In that respect, it 
should not matter what is actually motivating religious hate speech.  
It is part of the Human Rights Committee’s mandate to construe 
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR in a manner in which contemporary 
challenges can be tackled.
76
 In that respect, it is encouraging to see that 
the Committee in recent times has taken up the task of elaborating further 
on freedom of expression (Article 19 ICCPR), and the interplay of this 
right with Article 20(2) on hate speech, in the form of a new General 
Comment.77 The draft General Comment resolves many long-standing 
 
 74. The initial trial commenced in 2010, was shortly suspended, and has resumed with new 
judges in 2011. Dutch MP Geert Wilders Back in Court Over ‘Hate Speech’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 
2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12380167; Dutch MP Geert Wilders 
‘Can Challenge’ Islam Hate Trial, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2011, 1:44 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12456693.  
 75. Art. 137d Dutch Penal Code, in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: 
DUTCH PENAL CODE 133 (Louise Rayar & Stafford Wadsworth, trans., 1997) (emphasis added). 
Note that the emphasized “their” refers back to “persons.” 
 76.  The Human Rights Committee has considered “that the [ICCPR] should be interpreted as 
a living instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied in context and in the light of 
present–day conditions.” Human Rights Comm., Roger Judge v. Canada, Communication No. 
829/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (2003), Views of 5 August 2002, ¶ 10.3. 
 77. Office of U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights [O.H.C.H.R.], Human Rights Comm., 
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debates: the precise nature of state obligations, the relationship between 
the prohibition of hate speech and freedom of expression, and the precise 
meaning of some of the key terms. Additionally, it provides some 
guidance on the necessary safeguards that must be in place in order to 
combat hate speech.78  
Though the Committee still leaves a number of issues unresolved, it 
does certainly provide answers to some questions. In particular, the new 
draft General Comment makes clear that not every type of advocacy of 
hatred ought to be prohibited. Specifically, only the advocacy of 
religious79 hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, 
or violence is to be a priori prohibited by states. Forms of advocacy that 
fall short of such incitement are not covered by the provisions of the 
Covenant. In its second and third drafts of the General Comment, the 
Committee had defined key terms:  
 Advocacy: “By ‘advocacy’ is meant public forms of 
expression that are intended to elicit action or 
response.”80 
 Hatred: “By ‘hatred’ is meant intense emotions of 
opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards a target 
 
Draft General Comment No. 34, Upon Completion of the First Reading by the Human Rights 
Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.5 (Nov. 25, 2010) [hereinafter, Draft General 
Comment, Nov. 25]. Draft General Comment 34 on Article 19 is expected to be adopted by the 
Committee in 2011. The General Comment, once adopted, will replace General Comment 10 on 
Article 19, and will complement General Comment 11, which already—albeit very briefly—touched 
upon advocacy of hatred. As of November 2010, the Committee has completed its “first reading” of 
the document, resulting in a fourth revised draft (Member Prof. O’Flaherty is the principal drafter). 
The first reading and the resulting fourth draft were completed in October–November 2010, and the 
draft Comment has been posted on the Human Rights Committee’s website so as to invite responses 
from experts and stakeholders. Human Rights Committee–General Comments: Comment 34, OFFICE 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,  
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). In what 
follows, reference is made to the draft Comment as circulated by the Committee in November 2010, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.5, unless expressly indicated otherwise. The document used is 
subject to changes. 
 78. See generally TOBY MENDEL, CTR. FOR LAW AND DEMOCRACY, RESTRICTING FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION: STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES (2010), available at http://www.law-
democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/10.03.Paper-on-Restrictions-on-FOE.pdf. 
 79. Note that Art. 20(2) of the ICCPR also prohibits advocacy of national and racial hatred. 
This account solely focuses on advocacy of religious hatred. 
 80. Draft General Comment No. 34, Article 19, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.2 (Jan. 
29, 2010); Draft General Comment No. 34, Article 19, 2nd Revised Draft, ¶ 53 
CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.3 (June 28, 2010) [hereinafter Draft General Comment, June 28]. 
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individual or group.”81 
 Incitement: “‘Incitement’ refers to the need for the 
advocacy to be likely to trigger imminent acts of 
discrimination, hostility or violence . . . . It would be 
sufficient that the incitement relate to any one of the 
three outcomes: discrimination, hostility or violence.”82 
In the October and November 2010 drafts,83 these definitions have been 
deleted. Although it was perhaps slightly progressive to offer such 
extensive definitions of the prohibition’s key terms, and although any 
definition provided would likely draw criticism from at least some states, 
altogether the deletion of these definitions is regrettable. In particular, 
these definitions made clearer what actually constitutes hatred.84  
Moreover, the deletion is particularly regrettable as the definitions 
provided the precise extent to which mens rea is an element of the crime 
of hate speech, thus indicating a threshold for this crime and, in so doing, 
surrounding the prohibition with concrete safeguards against abuse at the 
national level. Specifically, the definitions made it clear that for speech 
or a publication to amount to “advocacy,” one must intend to at least 
“elicit action or response.”85 For the advocacy to amount to incitement, 
in turn, it is necessary (under the abandoned definitions) that the speech 
or publication be “likely to trigger imminent acts of discrimination, 
hostility or violence.”86 At the same time, it is clear that not all forms of 
advocacy of hatred are to be prohibited, but only those instances that 
constitute “incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence” (it is clear, 
given the word “or,” that it is sufficient that the incitement relate to any 
one of the three outcomes).87 It is also clear that, at a minimum, one such 
outcome must be intended.  
Again, domestic state practices indicate that the present process of 
enacting hate speech legislation is a rather tentative affair and apparently 
not informed by international benchmarks. Let us consider the Dutch 
 
 81. Draft General Comment, June 28, supra note 80, ¶ 53. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Draft General Comment No. 34, (Upon Completion of the First Reading by the Human 
Rights Committee), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.4 (Oct. 22, 2010); Draft General Comment, 
Nov. 25, supra note 78. 
 84. This is true even though the Committee again failed to make explicit, for once and for all, 
the multifaceted nature of religious hatred. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 85. Draft General Comment, June 28, supra note 80, ¶ 53. 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
 87. Id.  
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example once more: “A person who publicly, either orally or in writing 
or by image, incites hatred of or discrimination against persons . . . on 
the grounds of their . . . religion or personal beliefs . . . is liable to a term 
of imprisonment of not more than one year or a fine of the third 
category.”88 The threshold of the Dutch offense would seem to be 
considerably lower than the international norm, which, again, prohibits 
only advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility, or violence.89 
The Comment is careful on the issue of Holocaust denial. In 
particular, rather than considering this form of extreme speech as falling 
automatically within the ambit of advocacy of hatred within the meaning 
of Article 20(2), the Committee’s considerations are characterized by 
concern about “memory-laws.” Specifically, the Committee provided 
that the  
Laws that penalise the promulgation of specific views about past 
events, so called “memory-laws”, must be reviewed to ensure they 
violate neither freedom of opinion nor expression. The Covenant does 
not permit general prohibitions on expression of historical views, nor 
does it prohibit a person’s entitlement to be wrong or to incorrectly 
interpret past events. Restrictions must never be imposed on the right of 
freedom of opinion and, with regard to  
freedom of expression they may not go beyond what is permitted in 
paragraph 3 or required under article 20.90  
Given their general nature, these considerations cannot be deemed a  
departure from earlier Views,91 but the level of expressed concern is 
nonetheless striking. 
 The Draft Comment additionally explains the relationship between 
freedom of expression and the prohibition of hate speech: 
The acts that are addressed in article 20 are of such an extreme nature 
that they would all be subject to restriction pursuant to Article 19, 
paragraph 3. As such, a limitation that is justified on the basis of article 
20 must also comply with article 19, paragraph 3,  
 
 88. ART. 137D (DUTCH PENAL CODE), reprinted in 30 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN 
PENAL CODES: DUTCH PENAL CODE 133 (Louise Rayar & Stafford Wadsworth, trans., 1997) 
(emphasis added). 
 89. ICCPR, supra note 23, at Art. 20(2) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”). 
 90. Draft General Comment, Nov. 25, supra note 80, ¶ 51.  
 91. Robert Faurisson v. France, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 550/1993, 
Views of 8 November 1996, UN Doc. CCCCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996). 
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which lays down requirements for determining whether restrictions on 
expression are permissible.92  
In other words, Article 20(2) ICCPR is lex specialis to the extent that this 
is the only form of speech with respect to which an a priori response by 
the state is required (their prohibition by law).93 At the same time it is 
clear that this ground for limitation is treated on par with those provided 
by Article 19(3) ICCPR. This additionally underscores the fact that 
interference with free speech on account of hate speech concerns must 
always be provided by a law prohibiting extreme speech. Furthermore, 
given the interrelation between Articles 19 and 20, such standard 
benchmarks as necessity and proportionality play a role in assessing 
interference based on hate speech regulations.  
2.  State obligations 
Article 20(2) ICCPR itself leaves little doubt that legislative action is 
necessary since advocacy or religious hatred “shall be prohibited by 
law.”94 On the other hand, a number of states upon ratification entered 
reservations or declarations to Article 20(2) ICCPR stating that 
compliance with this provision shall not, as far as 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no
=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en these states are concerned, entail the 
issuance of laws prohibiting extreme speech.95 In its General Comment, 
 
 92. Draft General Comment, Nov. 25, supra note 80, ¶ 52 (citing Ross v. Canada, No. 
736/1997). 
 93. See id. ¶ 53. 
 94. ICCPR, supra note 23, Art. 20(2). 
 95. Malta entered a reservation: “The Government of Malta interprets article 20 consistently 
with the rights conferred by Articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant but reserves the right not to 
introduce any legislation for the purposes of article 20.” Malta Reservation 5, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?scr=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter= 4&lang=en 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2011). New Zealand reserves the right not to introduce new legislation on this 
point:  
The Government of New Zealand having legislated in the areas of the advocacy of 
national and racial hatred and the exciting of hostility or ill will against any group of 
persons, and having regard to the right of freedom of speech, reserves the right not to 
introduce further legislation with regard to article 20. 
Id. at New Zealand. U.K.:  
The Government of the United Kingdom interpret article 20 consistently with the rights 
conferred by articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant and having legislated in matters of 
practical concern in the interests of public order (ordre public) reserve the right not to 
introduce any further legislation. The United Kingdom also reserve a similar right in 
regard to each of its dependent territories. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:49 PM 
729 Freedom of Expression and Religious Sensitivities 
 753 
the Human Rights Committee reiterates its own position and makes 
explicit that countering advocacy of religious hatred requires the 
adoption of laws prohibiting such extreme speech.96  
It must be noted that in previous drafts the Committee more strongly 
emphasized this point by stating that: 
Article 20 is an important tool for the protection of persons from 
discrimination, hostility or attack because of their national, racial or 
religious identity. It imposes an obligation on State parties with regard 
to the prohibition of specified forms of extreme speech. It requires 
legislative action of the part of States parties. Such legislation should 
be reviewed as necessary to take account of contemporary forms and 
manifestations of national, religious and racial hatred. It is not 
compatible with the Covenant for the 
legislative prohibitions to be enacted by means of customary, 
traditional or religious law.97  
The November 2010 draft still explicitly requires states to adopt 
legislation, but chooses to do so in more moderate language.98 Yet, 
moderation notwithstanding, it is clear that political commitment to this 
international norm alone is not sufficient. Compliance requires national 
implementation, and more particularly, a law explicitly prohibiting 
advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility, or violence. This also means that the issue cannot be left to the 
discretion of a judge on a case-by-case basis, since limiting speech on 
this basis always requires a national law forbidding extreme speech. This 
is hardly a departure from previous doctrine (in that respect one may 
wonder why the Committee has toned down this part of the draft 
 
Id. at U.K. Australia:  
Australia interprets the rights provided for by articles 19, 21 and 22 as consistent with 
article 20; accordingly, the Common wealth and the constituent States, having legislated 
with respect to the subject matter of the article in matters of practical concern in the 
interest of public order (ordre public), the right is reserved not to introduce any further 
legislative provision on these matter. 
Id. at Australia, Article 14. USA: “That article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other 
action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id. at United States of America, Reservation 1. 
 96. See Draft General Comment, Nov. 25, supra note 80, ¶ 54 (“[I]t is only with regard to the 
specific forms of expression indicated in article 20 that States parties are obliged to have legal 
prohibitions.”). 
 97. Draft General Comment, Jan. 29, supra note 80, ¶ 50; Draft General Comment, June 28, 
supra note 81, ¶ 51 (citation omitted). 
 98. Draft General Comment, Nov. 25, supra note 80, ¶ 53 (“[T]he Covenant indicates the 
specific response required from the State: their [i.e. hate speech offenses] prohibition by law.”). 
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Comment). General Comment No. 11, as early as 1983, provided that  
For article 20 to become fully effective there ought to be a law making 
it clear that . . . advocacy as described therein [is] contrary to public 
policy and providing for an appropriate sanction in case of violation. 
The Committee, therefore, believes that States parties which have not 
yet done so should take the measures necessary to fulfil [sic] the 
obligations contained in article 20, and should themselves refrain from 
any such . . . advocacy.99  
In the eyes of the Human Rights Committee, the flip side of this 
increased focus on identifying what amounts to hate speech and what 
acts should be prohibited and combated is the decriminalization of 
speech and publications that do not amount to advocacy of religious 
hatred. Concretely, this means that states are to criminalize hate speech 
not alongside but instead of religious defamation or blasphemy offenses. 
The draft General Comment takes a firm stance on this debate when it 
provides that “States parties should repeal criminal law provisions on 
blasphemy and regarding displays of disrespect for religion or other 
belief  
system . . . .”100 Hopefully, this paragraph will survive the final drafting 
stages.101 
3.  Safeguards 
The Human Rights Committee is not solely concerned with states 
taking the prohibition of Article 20(2) ICCPR seriously in its recent 
efforts. The Committee equally underscores that states may not abuse the 
prohibition of advocacy of religious hatred to punish legal criticism of 
religion or to stifle unpopular and unwanted debate. First and foremost, it 
is clear that the threshold for acts that must be prohibited is exceptionally 
high: only the qualified act of advocating religious hatred that constitutes 
 
 99. Office of U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights [O.H.C.H.R.], Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment No. 11: Article 20 (Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national, racial 
or religious hatred), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Jan. 29, 1983), reprinted in Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, at 133 ¶ 2 (2003). The point has also been repeatedly made in the state reporting 
procedure in Concluding Observations. E.g., CCPR/CO/81/BEL (Belgium); CCPR/CO/84/SNV 
(Slovenia).  
 100. Draft General Comment, Nov. 25, supra note 80, ¶ 50. See also paragraph 49 on 
defamation laws (in which States are more moderately requested to “consider” the decriminalization 
of defamation). 
 101. See supra Part I (introductory remarks on the human rights concerns that surround the 
“combating defamation of religion” paradigm). 
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incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence is to be prohibited by 
states. Second, “[i]t is not compatible with the Covenant for the 
legislative prohibitions to be enacted by means of customary, traditional 
or religious law.”102 A legislative prohibition must be the result of 
competitive politics, so as to ensure that the result is not discriminatory 
(i.e., protects all religious minorities and other groups in need of 
protection), does not undermine free speech, and is otherwise in line with 
the state’s constitution and international human rights law. Finally, given 
the interrelation between Articles 19 and 20, such standard benchmarks 
as necessity and proportionality must play a role in assessing 
interferences based on hate speech regulations.103  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Within the European Convention system, judgments have supported 
legal restrictions on hate speech, but also on blasphemy or religious 
defamation. The universal human rights instruments, particularly the 
ICCPR, are increasingly geared towards eradicating hate speech (speech 
that threatens the rights and freedoms of others), whilst forms of extreme 
speech that fall short of that category are to be protected rather than 
countered by states. The Human Rights Committee’s draft General 
Comment on freedom of expression, to be adopted in 2011, provides 
another strong indication that this is the envisaged way forward: 
repealing blasphemy and defamation bills, whilst simultaneously 
increasing the efforts to combat hate speech. It is important to continue 
taking stock of the legal justifications for restrictions that are suggested 
in this area and to scrutinize whether they are in fact sustainable from a 
human rights perspective––not only on paper, but also in actual practice. 
Considering the different legal standards described in the article 
(universal vs. regional), as well as ongoing developments in the area of 
domestic hate speech measures, future research must take a double 
comparative approach: (i) it should aim at further comparing and 
contrasting the universal monitoring bodies’ approach to extreme speech 
with that of regional monitoring bodies; and (ii) it should aim at charting, 
comparing, and analyzing, from an international human rights 
perspective, recent forms of state practice in the field of dealing with 
 
 102. Draft General Comment, Jan. 29, supra note 80, ¶ 50; Draft General Comment, June 28, 
supra note 80, ¶ 5. Presently this idea is more generally referred to in Draft General Comment, Nov. 
25, supra note 80. It is to be hoped that the earlier, extended safeguard finds its way back into the 
Comment. 
 103. Draft General Comment, Nov. 25, supra note 41, ¶¶ 52–54. 
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extreme speech. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
